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The Crisis of Global Governance: Can International Political Legitimacy be Maintained?  




This essay explores the severity of the current crisis moment for global governance. This crisis is 
predicated upon decreased engagement of key western democracies coupled with the rising 
presence and tolerance of illiberal practices and authoritarian states. The essay argues that the 
crisis is one of legitimacy, which is not specific to a particular approach to global governance, 
but is in fact representative of the barriers to legitimacy for multilateral institutions in their 
entirety. The essay begins by situating the crisis moment and expanding on key factors that have 
contributed to it, including populism, nationalism, xenophobia, illiberalism, and organizational 
funding schemes. Drawing on the literature of John Ikenberry and Amitav Acharya, the liberal 
internationalist and fragmentation approaches are used as analytical frameworks to understand 
the relationship between political legitimacy and global governance. This exploration of 
legitimacy draws on early modern theorists Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber and connects to 
analyses of international political legitimacy through Jan-Aart Scholte and Jonas Tallberg. The 
discussion of legitimacy examines input and output sources of legitimacy for global governance 
institutions. Based on the coexistence of liberal internationalism and fragmentation, the essay 
concludes that the two approaches are not in conflict with each other as one might assume, but 
instead both continue to grapple with the question of international legitimacy. The purpose of 
this essay is to identify the key barriers to legitimacy facing global governance approaches. The 
essay concludes by identifying important components of international political legitimacy that 
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The Crisis of Global Governance: Can International Political Legitimacy be Maintained?  
Introduction  
Foundational principles of contemporary global governance and modern international 
organizations have been around since the early 19th century. While these principles have faced 
periodic moments of profound crisis over the past two centuries, one could argue that the Post-
World War II configuration of global governance and international organizations has never been 
threatened to the same extent as today. The first example of modern European cooperation was 
the Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine, founded in 1815 (Stephen, 2018, 96). The 
European Concert of Powers was another significant pre-World War I international institution 
with a regional focus in Europe (Acharya, 2017, 277). Over the decades that followed, many 
different components of global governance emerged. International cooperation was central to 
global governance and produced policy outcomes including, but not limited to, coordinated 
climate plans, financial regulation, trade agreements, and the establishment of international 
standards of human rights (Tallberg et al, 2018, 3). That said, international cooperation is 
increasingly threatened by the decreasing engagement of Western democracies and the rising 
tolerance of illiberal practices and authoritarian states. These factors have had a significant 
impact on the legitimacy of global governance and will be explored further in later sections. 
Many International Relations (IR) scholars agree that liberal internationalism has 
constituted the main approach to global governance through the 20th and 21st centuries 
(Ikenberry, 2009, 71). However, liberal internationalism has consistently faced moments of crisis 
arising from a lack of commitment to multilateral agreements or limited results from key 
institutions. Although crisis moments are not new to liberal internationalism, there is growing 
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concern regarding the current state of legitimacy for global governance (Önis & Kutlay, 2020; 
Ikenberry, 2017; Nye, 2017; Abramowitz, 2018; Abrahamsen et al, 2019; Scholte, 2011).   
This thesis will explore this crisis moment and assess the current legitimacy gap for 
global governance. This thesis begins by examining the current crisis moment and asking 
whether it is more pressing than ever before. By unpacking nationalism and populism in Western 
states, the rise of illiberalism, and the changes in organizational funding, the crisis moment can 
be better understood. Through the discussion of these key themes, this thesis argues that the 
current crisis moment is more pronounced and therefore must be seriously considered. This leads 
to questions about the legitimacy of global governance, which requires an understanding of 
certain analytical approaches.  
The second section of this thesis focuses on situating analytical approaches to global 
governance: namely, liberal internationalism and fragmentation as presented in John Ikenberry’s 
literature on ‘liberal internationalism’ and Amitav Acharya’s understanding of a ‘multiplex 
world’ that consists of many separate international orders (Acharya, 2017, 272). Ikenberry and 
Acharya adopt disparate approaches to global governance and have each contributed to 
significant literature on the differences between liberal internationalism and fragmentation. Their 
collective work is therefore fundamental to an understanding of the present crisis moment and, 
by extension, this thesis.  The purpose of this thesis is not to offer a comprehensive review of 
liberal internationalism and fragmentation, but instead to utilize these approaches as analytical 
tools to understand the topic of legitimacy as it pertains to global governance.  
In order to further understand the current legitimacy gap within global governance, the 
thesis will engage with the political theory of legitimacy. Much of the work of Acharya and 
Ikenberry focuses on the role of international institutions within global governance with attention 
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to the role of states and state actors. It is important to note that multilateral institutions are not the 
only form of global governance and instead constitute one venue through which international 
political legitimacy can be examined. For the purposes of exploring how the question of political 
legitimacy can be posed in the context of global governance, this thesis will draw particular 
attention to the role of states and international organizations while at the same time 
acknowledging that ‘international legitimacy’ can be analysed in ways that do not centre around 
states or international organizations. To begin, this analysis will involve an exploration of early 
modern political theorists, including Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber in order to understand 
early perspectives on legitimacy within domestic political systems. The political theory in this 
section mostly focuses on individual states. For this reason, the section transitions to more 
current understandings of international political legitimacy drawn from the work of Jan Aart 
Scholte and Jonas Tallberg. The thesis will introduce Scholte and Tallberg’s legitimacy matrix, 
which posits that international organizations attain legitimacy through input-sources (procedure) 
and output-source (performance). This matrix will also demonstrate that the question of 
international legitimacy can be posed outside of multilateral institutions as well. In this way, this 
thesis will focus on international organizations with the understanding that they are one of many 
components of international political legitimacy. In attempting to understand international 
political legitimacy, this section of the thesis will identify the core challenges facing both liberal 
internationalism and fragmentation as approaches to global governance. Ultimately, it becomes 
clear that both of these approaches are facing a legitimacy gap.  
In the final section, this thesis raises questions about the future of global governance and 
its legitimacy deficit. This section includes a discussion on the coexistence of fragmentation and 
liberal internationalism which challenges the idea that one approach to global governance is 
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superior to another. Further, this section involves exploring institutions and organizational 
performance by raising questions pertaining to the future of international political legitimacy. 
Finally, this thesis addresses the topic of illiberalism and the potential implications for the 
legitimacy of global governance.  
The thesis simultaneously offers a connection between approaches to global governance 
and the drivers of international political legitimacy. The literature on liberal internationalism and 
fragmentation centres around the role of multilateral institutions, but as noted the thesis will 
demonstrate that international legitimacy can be attained outside of international organizations. 
For this reason, although there will be a significant focus on the role of inter-governmental 
organizations (IGOs), the thesis will identify additional components of legitimacy in order to 
fully understand the legitimacy deficit facing global governance.   
This is the central problem that the thesis is trying to address: liberal internationalism and 
fragmentation are not competing approaches to global governance, but instead are both 
vulnerable to global governance’s crisis of legitimacy. Through an exploration of international 
political legitimacy with liberal internationalism and fragmentation as analytical tools, this thesis 
seeks to emphasize the importance of the legitimacy crisis while producing questions about the 
future of global governance. This leads to a number of questions about how legitimacy is 
obtained and sustained within global governance. These issues do not present a clear answer and 
thus, this thesis will not attempt to solve the current crisis moment. Instead, it will draw attention 
to the challenges and questions that global governance must face in order to obtain and maintain 




Chapter 1: Today’s Crisis: Worse than Before?  
Crises of global governance are not new. It is a common understanding within the 
international legal sector, for instance, that crisis is not infrequent and instead underlines the 
discipline and its reality (Charlesworth, 2002, 65). Orford, for example, argues that global 
governance continues to find itself in a “moment of danger” as it struggles to attain and maintain 
legitimacy (2004, 467). Given the absence of a formalized international sovereign figure, it is 
understandable that global governance systems would continue to face moments of crisis. Some 
global governance models have consisted of a state or group of states acting as “law’s sovereign 
guarantor”, however; this process prioritizes certain states over others and seeks to replicate a 
system of authority that international governance is meant to transcend (Orford, 2004, 444; 
Kennedy, 1994, 14). The alternative is a reality consisting of “pervasive uneasiness” that occurs 
without a single authority figure (Orford, 2004, 443).  
Although crises of global governance have occurred in the past, the present crisis moment 
is, arguably, more pressing. The liberal international order and fragmentation models of global 
governance, which will be examined more closely in Chapter Two are increasingly threatened by 
a lack of legitimacy in the international political environment. 
In the last few years, there have been countless threats to global governance. Even in the 
face of an ongoing climate crisis or the COVID-19 pandemic, both of which demand 
international collaboration and cooperation due to their inherently transnational nature, some 
governments and leaders are still rejecting the current multilateral system. Between the increased 
power of illiberal and authoritarian governments and the rise of populist leaders, the institutions 
and regimes of global governance have been significantly undermined. This contributes to the 
overwhelming concern within the field of IR that the liberal international order is in an especially 
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concerning moment of crisis. This section will identify these concerns and demonstrate their 
connection to international organizations. As this section will demonstrate, the crisis moment can 
be understood as a combination of rising illiberal practices and decreasing western engagement 
as they pertain to multilateral institutions. This will be shown through a number of key themes, 
including the rise of nationalism and populism, increased toleration of illiberal practices and 
governments, and a shift in financial support for international organizations.  
 
The Significance of Populism in the United States 
For some observers, the election of Donald Trump in 2016 represented a significant 
change in American politics. Within an established populist agenda, Trump campaigned to put 
‘America first’ and promised to create economic prosperity through isolationist policy 
(Carpenter, 2017, 35). Kagan argues that Trump’s election in 2016 signalled that a number of 
Americans demonstrated an “unwillingness to continue upholding the world order” (2017, 268). 
This is based on underlying components of Trump’s campaign, which included an “America first 
attitude towards global rules” that has resulted in a significant change in America’s approach to 
international affairs (Ikenberry, 2017, 4). Nye proposes that “the liberal international order is a 
project of just the sort of cosmopolitan elites whom populists see as the enemy” (2017, 14). 
Trump’s election was able to capitalize, in part, on this view of the cosmopolitan elite as the 
enemy. This view was accompanied by what some perceive to be the rejection of America’s 
significant international engagement and commitment to international cooperation.  
From the perspective of liberal internationalism, the Trump campaign’s understanding is 
flawed, as states are expected to value international cooperation in order to benefit from 
outcomes that reflect shared interests, such as the maintenance of free trade or human rights 
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(Ikenberry, 2017, 3-5). Ikenberry goes on to argue this ‘America first attitude’ “misses the larger, 
interdependent logic of the U.S.-led system” (2017, 4). This refers to the perspective that as a 
powerful state, the United States has historically agreed not to act individually, but instead to 
restrict aspects of its power in order to appeal to other states (2017, 5). In turn, the United States 
receives access to other global regions through cooperation as opposed to conflict. This allows 
the United States to maintain political and financial influence that helps to shape the nature of 
international agreements and commitments in a way that is beneficial to its national interests. For 
some scholars, the Trump administration’s approach is relatively unprecedented based on 
America’s record of supporting liberal values in the post WWII international order (Ikenberry, 
2017, 6). This contributes to the severity of the crisis moment for global governance.  
 
The Rise of Nationalism and Xenophobia in Europe  
European nationalism has grown to involve an overwhelming rejection of key 
international organizations; notably the European Union (EU). With a significant increase in the 
number of elected officials from “xenophobic, far-right parties” (Abramowitz, 2018, 15), 
democratic values in Europe have been significantly undermined since the influx of refugees into 
Europe in 2015-2016.  Far-right political sentiments are not new to Europe, but presently, right-
wing support is increasing. Although many European states do not yet have populist leaders, they 
could in short order, all of which suggests that public political sentiment is changing in Europe 
(Abramowitz, 2018, 15-16; Carpenter, 2017, 33-5, 41). The EU itself is committed to 
multilateralism and asserts that a united Europe is critical for citizens (Dworkin & Leonard, 
2018, 3-4; Gowan, 2018, 3). Dworkin and Leonard propose that “a renewed commitment to 
multilateralism [is] the best way of securing Europeans’ security and prosperity” (2018, 23). The 
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discussion of a “renewed commitment” is reflective of the political environment within Europe 
and current hesitancy towards the EU.  
The best example of this is the result of the United Kingdom’s 2016 referendum, 
popularly known as ‘Brexit’, where citizens voted to leave the EU. But even before Brexit, 
European sentiments were tense. In 2011, Marine Le Pen, the French leader of the National 
Front, began to question France’s EU membership, beginning with a scathing public address 
undermining the importance of the EU, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European 
Central Bank (Reynié, 2016, 53). There are additional concerns beyond Europe, too. The EU 
Council on Foreign Relations has identified the USA as one of three main challengers at the 
United Nations (UN), alongside Russia and China (Gowan, 2018, 5). This is extremely 
problematic as it demonstrates a breakdown of American-European cooperation, which, as many 
scholars in IR have noted, has been central to the post-WWII liberal international order (Gowan, 
2018, 17). This breakdown has also contributed to the creation of “political space” for illiberal 
states – Russia and China among them – in key international organizations such as the UN 
(Gowan, 2018, 6). Considering the importance of European states and the US in creating and 
monitoring the current global governance system, this fracturing alliance presents a threat to 
global governance.  
 
Increasing Tolerance for Illiberalism  
Illiberal and authoritarian practices are often incorrectly equated. Although similar in 
nature, illiberal practices are violations or rejections of human rights whereas authoritarian 
practices represent a threat to democracy itself (Glasius, 2018, 517; Zakaria, 1997, 40). For the 
purpose of this analysis, the term ‘illiberal’ will reflect illiberal and authoritarian practices, given 
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the fact that sustained illiberal practices can lead to threats to democracy as well (Glasius, 2018, 
517).   
The increasing tolerance of illiberal states and practices can be seen in Europe through 
the actions of states such as Hungary and Poland, who have been “uprooting democratic 
institutions and intimidating critics in civil society” (Abramowitz, 2018, 16). States such as 
Russia and China have continued to undermine and alter the liberal international system in order 
to achieve their political ends, however these ends may be defined. Abramowitz describes this 
phenomenon as an incessant need for Russia and China to “compromise rules-based institutions 
beyond their borders” (2018, 10). Not only do illiberal states and practices represent a threat to 
the liberal international order, but their actions raise important questions about the future of 
global governance. China and Russia consistently oppose the US, UK, and France on topics 
pertaining to humanitarian situations (Oludoun, 2014, 77). Even Acharya, a proponent of 
regional fragmentation, has not sufficiently accounted for the presence of illiberal practices 
within global governance, as they directly conflict with liberal normative structures, which are 
central to global governance for liberal states such as the US, UK, and France. For this reason, 
the growing tolerance of illiberal practices contributes to the crisis of the liberal international 
order (Deudney & Ikenberry, 2018, 19; Zakaria, 1997, 31; Petrasek, 2019, 104).  
Illiberal states still have a defined role within the current system of global governance. 
States such as China and Russia hold veto power on the UN Security Council; arguably the most 
consequential authority on matters of peace and security in international relations. These states 
are playing a central role in challenging norms of the rules-based international order by 
providing counter-norms. This is most clearly seen through the focus on countering potential 
infringement on the sovereignty of individual states. China leads these efforts through “critiquing 
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liberal democracy’s universalism as well as the political conditionality that international 
institutions adopt to further universal democratic norms” (Cooley, 2015, 51). This perspective 
prioritizes the individual sovereignty of states as opposed to acknowledging the liberal 
internationalist perspective that democratic principles and models of governance help to foster 
global peace and security. Abramowitz argues that China is providing a framework for other 
states to follow that includes actions leading to “politicized courts, intolerance for dissent, and 
predetermined elections” (2018, 1). However, these actions are not unique to China and are 
becoming more frequent worldwide. This authoritarian rejection of democratic practices is 
closely connected to illiberal practices, including a weakening of support for internationally 
recognized standards on human rights.  
Russia and China have retained their power within the UN without formally supporting 
the spread of democratic norms around the world. This is further supported through the idea that: 
“China has tried not to overthrow the current order but rather to increase its influence within it” 
(Nye, 2017, 13). On the other hand, initiatives such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO), a regional group established in 2001 that prioritizes state sovereignty and rejects global 
governance institutions, demonstrates the ways in which authoritarian states are impacting the 
liberal internationalist character of the global governance system through the creation of new 
organizations and the rejection of international cooperation outside of specified regions or policy 
domains (Cooley, 2015, 52). This assessment is critical to the current crisis of global governance 





Funding: A Precarious Arrangement  
International organizations largely rely on state funding in order to be able to provide 
services and execute programming. Changes to funding allocations create a tangible threat for 
the existence of international organizations, but they also posit a darker reality in terms of how 
financial wealth dictates global governance. The first component to consider is the direct 
financial contributions of major states. China now provides more in development assistance to 
Latin America than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined and 
has also doubled their aid contributions in Africa (Cooley, 2015, 59). Increased Chinese funding 
does not stop there. China has become the “second-largest contributor to the $7 billion UN 
peacekeeping budget” behind the US (Gowan, 2018, 8). This funding comes at a time when the 
American President is “willing to rethink the United States’ financial and political commitment 
to the UN” (Ikenberry, 2017, 6). This is an important consideration as Cooley identifies that “in 
the 1990s, the West still had a near-exclusive role as the provider of international funding” 
(2015, 60). China has been the greatest exception to this, however, Cooley identifies that many 
“emerging donors have stepped in to aid countries not serviced by the Western-led aid 
community” (2015, 59). The reality is that changes to global governance funding models could 
significantly impact the liberal international order. If the US and European states no longer 
provide the most funding for international organizations, and have less influence as a result, the 
current crisis moment could be exacerbated.    
There is a perception that has been heavily perpetuated by the Trump Administration that 
American involvement and financial support to key international organizations is unequal and 
greater than other member countries’ contributions. This claim is based on the fact that the US 
typically contributes higher membership dues to international organizations than other member 
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states (Graham, 2017, 22). Ikenberry argues that the US has historically contributed in this way 
in order to lead the international order, and in doing so, prioritize American interests regarding 
the economy, politics, and security (2017, 4). However, many theorists argue that, more than 
merely advancing American interests, these contributions are necessary in cementing the liberal 
international order around the world (Nye, 2017, 13; Ikenberry, 2017, 4-5). In this way, rejecting 
the liberal international order is equivalent to giving up significant global political influence and 
undermining the order in and of itself. 
This is only further complicated through the ongoing increase in earmarked donations to 
international organizations from a variety of stakeholders. Initially, designated donations were 
prohibited in many institutions, but “rule changes opened the door to the rise in earmarked 
resources” (Graham, 2017, 17). These resources can be tied to specific projects or initiatives, 
which allows individual states to more easily dictate the direction and decisions of a particular 
organization. This transition has also allowed other stakeholders to become more actively 
involved in the work of IGOs. Most organizations do not include non-state actors within their 
voting structure, but donations from non-state actors have the potential to influence decision-
making within institutions nevertheless (Graham, 2017, 21). This form of fragmentation involves 
greater engagement of non-state actors, but many theorists also argue that it is a direct threat to 
the liberal international order. Cooley argues that the changes in international organization 
funding create “more contention over the normative foundations of the international order (with 
non-liberal voices having a bigger say than before), more authority for counter-norms such as 
non-interference in countries’ internal affairs, and more influence for various authoritarian 
alternatives to liberal democracy” (2015, 60). This argument raises questions pertaining to the 
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legitimacy of the current global governance structure and whether it is still effective in 
maintaining the liberal international order.  
In concluding this section, it is necessary to understand that the current crisis moment is 
multifaceted. The rise of populism in the USA, nationalism and xenophobia within the EU, 
illiberal practices, and organizational funding have contributed to a significant crisis moment for 
liberal internationalism. Populism, nationalism, and xenophobia have significantly affected the 
ability of European countries and the USA to effectively maintain the liberal international order. 
Deudney and Ikenberry offer that these factors contribute to Europe and the USA undermining 
the liberal order which they historically promoted (2018, 19). Further, illiberal practices are of 
grave concern for liberal internationalism. Gheciu asserts that liberal and illiberal states and 
leaders will continue to clash in years ahead, particularly in the West (2019, 45). This increase in 
illiberal states and authoritarian practices has the potential to become more significant as states 
such as China continue to increase their funding of international organizations. As illiberal states 
continue to maintain global influence, the severity of the crisis moment will only be enhanced 
(Dworkin & Leonard, 2018, 7). Alongside decreasing participation from the USA and EU 
countries, the increasing tolerance for illiberal practices within a fragmented structure creates a 
significant challenge for the liberal international order as it seeks to maintain democratic and 
liberal norms amidst a number of increasingly illiberal states.  
 
Chapter 2 –Understanding the Crisis Moment  
Introducing the Liberal International Order 
This section will not provide a comprehensive overview of the liberal international order 
but will instead utilize the approach as an analytical tool to understand how the question of 
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legitimacy relates to global governance. According to some IR scholars, international 
cooperation, as embodied in the establishment of the first universal international organization, 
began to formally materialize after World War I, with the efforts of Woodrow Wilson and key 
European actors in creating the League of Nations (Ikenberry, 2009. 71). Ikenberry and others 
describe this as the first stage of liberal internationalism, with significant subsequent 
developments based on this model during the post-World War II and Cold War periods 
(Ikenberry, 2009, 71). Central to these developments was the creation of the League’s successor, 
the United Nations (UN). The UN charter was adopted in October 1945 with the goal of creating 
a system conducive to continued collaboration, peace, and security after World War II (Carswell, 
2013; Ikenberry, 2009, 73). Ikenberry argues that this order was liberal based on the general 
values of cooperation, restraint, and sovereign equality (2009, 72).  
From the perspective of liberal internationalism, the founding of the UN along with the 
other key economic multilateral institutions, in addition to the goal of maintaining peace and 
security, also sought to strengthen and expand a rules-based international order. A rules-based 
order refers to the creation and maintenance of agreed-upon norms that are meant to guide 
international activity (Ikenberry, 2018, 12; Dunne, 2010, 537. As the order has developed, it has 
evolved in terms of its focus, now encompassing a broad range of critical policy domains that 
include, among others, financial policies, trade agreements, human rights, peace and security, 
and the maintenance of international law (Ikenberry, 2017, 2; Dworkin & Leonard, 2018, 4; 
Alcaro, 2018, 155). 
While the ‘rules’ of the rules based international order may seek to govern many policy 
domains, which in turn concern the activities of a wide spectrum of domestic and international 
public and private actors, cooperation between states remains a critical component of the liberal 
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international order. In other words, the role of the state remains crucial to the liberal 
internationalist world view. Ikenberry asserts that early liberal internationalism prioritized rules 
to “facilitate and reinforce cooperation and collective problem solving” (2009, 72) among states. 
This cooperation has been critical in creating a liberal international order that both creates a 
system of allies and partnerships which promote peace and security while maintaining a focus on 
supporting the expansion of norms often associated with the prevailing model of Western liberal 
democracies (Ikenberry, 2009, 73; Stephen, 2018, 114; Beetham & Lord, 2001, 446). 
Many scholars maintain that the liberal international order was successfully maintained 
for seven decades, yet there is growing concern regarding its stability (Abrahamsen et al, 2019, 
11; Ikenberry, 2009, 77; Kagan, 2017, 269). Ikenberry’s understanding of liberal 
internationalism is critical in contextualizing the liberal international order’s progression over 
time and the manner in which it has emerged from moments of crisis. Table 1 illustrates the 
central components of the different eras of liberal internationalism, as theorized by Ikenberry.  
Table 1 – Ikenberry’s Progression of Liberal Internationalism  




- Universal Membership 
- Emphasis on State 
Sovereignty/Independence 
- Normative Structure 
- Focus on Trade and Collective 
Security 
- Normative frameworks were not 
binding 
- Insufficient institutional 
commitments  





- Western-focused system 
- USA as hegemonic state 
- Added policy domains 
(economic regulation + human 
rights) 
- Reduction in State Sovereignty 
- Impact of the end of the Cold 
War on American hegemony 
- Decreased state sovereignty and 
human rights 
- Lack of authority figure 
(Ikenberry, 2009, 74-79) 
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Ikenberry asserts that the start of liberal internationalism (1.0) emerged under Woodrow 
Wilson but failed based on a lack of institutional commitments and strong normative frameworks 
(2009, 75-76). This means that institutions were unable to collaborate to the extent that was 
needed to mitigate economic and security issues. Liberal Internationalism 2.0 was built upon 
American hegemonic power resulting from the Cold War, but in the post-Cold War period, the 
United States has failed to maintain significant influence amidst increasingly contested norms 
and structures (Ikenberry, 2009, 79). As noted above, table 1 summarizes Ikenberry’s perspective 
on the key characteristics and failings of liberal internationalism 1.0 and 2.0. The table is helpful 
in understanding how the liberal order might respond to the current crisis moment, albeit one that 
is arguably more severe than in the past.  
 
The Fragmentation Approach 
While many view the post-war order through the ‘liberal internationalist’ lens, and while 
liberal internationalism may be one of the dominant perspectives in IR, some scholars have 
proposed alternative analytical frameworks. Among these alternatives, the concept of 
‘fragmentation’ has figured prominently. Most notably, the work of Acharya is critical in terms 
of explicitly connecting fragmentation to global governance and framing the concept as one in 
opposition to the liberal international order. Fragmentation can be seen as an approach to global 
governance based on the acceptance and promotion of regionalized structures that do not 
necessarily prioritize hegemonic states. Fragmentation refers to a political environment in which 
policy domains are “marked by a patchwork of international institutions” that cover different 
subject areas or regions (Biermann et al, 2009, 16). Fragmentation was first explored in the 
1970s as theorists began to unpack overlapping responsibilities within international institutions 
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(Biermann et al, 2009, 16-17; Andresen & Hey, 2005; Schmidt & Kochan, 1977). It was also an 
important concept within international law, often in emphasizing the importance of consistent 
authority and legal practices (Koskienemmi & Leino, 2002, 558; Hafner, 2004, 856).  
Acharya recognizes the growing presence of fragmentation through regional and 
international agreements, the role of social movements, and civil society actors (2016, 453). In 
this regard, Acharya further posits that fragmentation may offer an alternative model of global 
governance to the liberal international order. He argues that a “key factor driving fragmentation 
is the outdated system of privilege enjoyed by Western countries and their abuse of existing rules 
and norms and resistance to the lack of reform of multilateral institutions” (2016, 457). In this 
regard, fragmentation is not a new construct, but may have newfound support based on the 
potential positive implications for industrializing nations or states from the Global South, who 
have not had sufficient international power in the past. Oludoun further supports this argument, 
specifically by looking at the role of the UN, which is described as an “out-dated distribution of 
world power” (2014, 87). However, fragmentation is not solely advantageous due to increased 
membership. There are a number of components to fragmentation which are summarized in the 
table below.   
Table 2 – Biermann’s Typology of Fragmentation 
Categories/Degrees Synergistic Cooperative Conflictive 
Institutional 
Integration 
One core institution, 
with other institutions 
being closely 
integrated 
Core institutions with 
other institutions that 




Core norms of 
institutions are 
integrated 
Core norms are not 
conflicting 
Core norms conflict 
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Actor Constellations 
All relevant actors 
support the same 
institutions 




Major actors support 
different institutions 
(Biermann et al, 2009, 19) 
Biermann’s typology of fragmentation is effective in identifying the key categories and 
degrees of fragmentation. This typology outlines how fragmentation materializes in terms of its 
impact on norms, actors, and institutions. The model incorporates the aforementioned categories 
and theorizes three distinct degrees of fragmentation: synergistic, cooperative, and conflictive 
(Biermann et al, 2009, 19). Synergistic fragmentation involves highly integrated institutions and 
norms, which are supported by a majority of actors. This would allow for a fragmented, yet 
collaborative system. Cooperative fragmentation includes institutions and norms that are not in 
conflict with each other, but are not necessarily complementary. Similarly, actors cooperate with 
institutions even if they are not directly involved themselves. Finally, conflictive fragmentation 
consists of disconnected institutions with conflicting norms and unique supporters. This leads to 
clashes between institutional and normative structures depending on the level of support from 
key actors.  This model is supported by various theorists who accept that fragmentation exists 
within global governance and that further study must determine the future impacts of the 
fragmentation approach (Zelli, 2018, 173; Keohane & Victor, 2011, 14).  
This section has outlined the liberal internationalism and fragmentation approaches to 
global governance primarily through the work of Ikenberry and Acharya. Ikenberry provides an 
understanding of the progression of liberal internationalism and outlines how the approach has 
progressed from the post-World War I period to the post-Cold War period. Ikenberry further 
identifies that liberal internationalism has faced crisis moments before, which is helpful in 
understanding the current crisis moment. In terms of fragmentation, Acharya describes the 
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approach as an alternative to liberal internationalism which increasingly accounts for 
industrializing and non-Western states. Biermann’s typology further unpacks fragmentation and 
develops a categorization system simplifying the approach to the impact on institutions, norms, 
and actors. This assists in understanding the degrees of fragmentation and offers a tool for 
comparison between the approaches. Rather than provide an in-depth analysis of liberal 
internationalism and fragmentation, this discussion has focused on using each approach as an 
analytical tool to discuss the issue of legitimacy in the context of global governance. However, 
political legitimacy is a complex subject and can be explored from many angles, which will be 
the subject of the next section.  
 
Chapter 3 - Understanding Political Legitimacy 
The question of how political legitimacy has led to complex theorization is based on 
various key factors and themes. To begin exploring legitimacy, this section will build on the 
work of Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber and their respective understandings of legitimacy and 
authority. This assessment of legitimacy will then focus on what makes a political order 
legitimate or illegitimate. Ultimately, this section will draw on literature that has explored 
legitimacy within the context of international relations and global governance. This analysis will 
focus on a number of themes, including membership, procedure and performance, democratic 
norms, and international law. These sources of legitimacy can be categorized into input-oriented 
and output-oriented sources, depending on whether the value of a multilateral institution lies in 
the access it provides or the outcomes it creates (Tallberg et al, 2018, 14). This approach will 
allow for a stronger understanding of the question of legitimacy as it pertains to various 
approaches to global governance, including liberal internationalism and fragmentation.   
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Understanding Early Modern Interpretations of Legitimacy   
(i)  Authority  
In order to explore legitimacy as a framework, it is necessary to look at the work of 
modern political theorists including Max Weber and Thomas Hobbes. Weber’s understanding of 
legitimacy starts with the concept of ‘social approval’: where all power must have implicit and 
explicit societal approval in order to be considered legitimate. (Weber, 1968, 31). Weber’s 
understanding is based on a domestic model, which raises an interesting question in terms of how 
social approval could exist within international authority: what, precisely, constitutes the ‘social’ 
in the international realm? A similar problematique can be applied to Hobbes’ understanding of 
sovereign figures. Hobbes argues that the ideal political structure is based on a sovereign figure 
who derives power from its subjects. Specifically, Hobbes articulates that the ideal political 
structure is one where “men agree amongst themselves, to submit to some man, or assembly of 
men … to be protected by him against all others” (2012, 407). This is different from Weber’s 
concept of social approval, as for Hobbes, citizens agree to cede their power to a sovereign figure 
in order to receive protection. This ceding of power is set in a domestic context and seeks to 
promote a hegemonic political order, which is seen as more challenging within international 
politics due to consistent concerns regarding the lack of an ‘international’ sovereign authority 
figure.  
For Weber, legitimate power is based on social approval and is made up of three types of 
authority: traditional, charismatic, and legal (Weber, 1968, 215). Traditional authority refers to 
authority based on tradition or custom; usually a component of societal structures (Weber, 1968, 
227). This does not necessarily refer only to political authority. It can also refer to the authority 
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of religious leaders, provided that it is socially approved. Charismatic authority refers to 
obtaining control through popular support, typically as a result of character traits synonymous 
with leadership (Weber, 1968, 242). Finally, legal authority refers to the set of laws, rules, or 
norms that govern a particular society (Weber, 1968, 217).  
Hobbes’ concept of the socially approved ceding of power is similar to the reasoning 
behind the creation of the global governance system following World War II and the Cold War. 
Indeed, the post-war order was created to establish a security community, made up of states with 
similar interests (Dworkin and Leonard, 2018, 4). The challenge with the connection to Hobbes 
lies in the ability of a sovereign to maintain authority, as it is noted that “if the people rebel, the 
sovereign must, Hobbes argues, have recourse to arms to enforce civil order” (Williams, 1996, 
221). This is unfeasible for global governance as there is a requirement for multilateral 
institutions to respect state sovereignty and no formal ‘ceding’ of sovereignty to anything 
resembling a ‘global sovereign’ takes place. This represents one of the challenges with the 
transition from domestic understandings of legitimacy to international realities. On the other 
hand, Weber’s analysis of power maintains that legitimate authority can be achieved in a variety 
of ways, provided that it is socially approved (Weber, 1968, 215). When applied to global 
governance, this reinforces the idea that there is no single path to legitimacy. Although Weber 
and Hobbes’ perspectives can be applied to global governance, they were theorized with 
domestic political systems in mind. For this reason, it is necessary to look at contemporary 





(ii)  Normative and Sociological Legitimacy 
Normative and sociological legitimacy are modern concepts pertaining to how legitimacy 
is obtained. Normative legitimacy refers to the moral or legal “right of a political institution to 
rule” whereas sociological legitimacy is a “belief among the subjects of a governing institution 
that it is legitimate” (Agne, 2018, 25). Normative legitimacy relates back to Weber’s assertions 
regarding legal and traditional authority due to the fact that organizational procedures or rules 
can force member states to engage and collaborate within institutions. Further, aspects of 
charismatic authority could be compared to sociological legitimacy. Through this understanding, 
a leader can be designated legitimate based on leadership traits and endorsement of the latter as 
measured by public opinion.  
This can be extended to the sociological legitimacy of multilateral institutions, based on 
the argument that political actors (individuals, civil society actors, and states) must believe that 
the organization is legitimate. This is supported by Scholte who asserts that legitimacy must have 
grounds beyond policy outcomes including various factors, notably charismatic leadership (2011, 
114). The discussion of charismatic leadership provides a connection to Weber’s understanding 
of charismatic authority, which is founded on leadership through popular support. Connections 
between types of authority and legitimacy illustrate that they are distinct concepts, yet some 
theorists view them as synonymous. Buchanan and Keohane posit that an institution’s legitimacy 
supposes that it has the right to rule over others (2006, 409-410). This argument oversimplifies 
the concept of legitimacy and presents it as all-encompassing. The normative and sociological 
forms of legitimacy are unique yet interconnected, given the fact that social beliefs regarding 
legitimacy are informed by societal norms relating to the appropriate uses of authority (Tallberg 
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and Zurn, 2019, 577). Thus, it is imperative to consider that legitimacy and authority are not 
absolute and instead vary depending on individual member states, institutions, and individuals.  
 
(iii) Authority and Legitimacy 
It is critical to understand that authority and legitimacy are not necessarily the same 
concept but must be understood as interrelated. This distinction is relevant as a lack of authority 
is a central challenge of legitimacy for global governance. Rosenau and Czempiel identify that 
unlike individual state governments, governance does not rely on formal authority1, which means 
that structures and decisions must be accepted by a majority of states in order to be effective 
(1992, 4). This is a limited understanding as it only mentions legitimacy in terms of membership, 
however; recognizing the complex relationship between legitimacy and authority is vital. For 
Weber and other modern theorists, authority and legitimacy are independent concepts. Weber 
argues that every authoritative body “attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its 
legitimacy” (Weber, 1968, 213). This implies that institutions with authority still have to obtain 
legitimacy from society, thus identifying the two concepts as interrelated yet independent. Some 
theorists even identify a formal “authority-legitimacy link”, due to the fact that legitimacy can 
only exist when an organization has authority (Tallberg and Zurn, 2019, 586). This is true to an 
extent, but only if authority and legitimacy are considered to be on a spectrum. Organizations 
can have varying levels of authority depending on their perceived legitimacy, which is also a 
variable that can change frequently. This relates back to the crisis of global governance: 
decreasing perceived legitimacy in multilateral institutions. At times, institutions may retain 
 
1 Formal authority refers to a political system in which there is a singular entity that has legitimate authority. This 
authority would usually have central enforcement powers that can implement centralized policies (Rosenau & 
Czempiel, 1992, 4; Take, 2012, 220).  
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authority over budgets or international policy domains, yet their perceived legitimacy is 
decreasing, meaning that their actions are not as impactful. This is contextualized well by 
Tallberg and Zurn, who describe that “a person may recognize the authority of the [World Trade 
Organization] as the principal forum for developing international trade law but have little 
confidence in the exercise of this authority” (2019, 586). They later posit that this is reflective of 
the “authority-legitimacy gap” based on increased political authority of multilateral institutions 
coupled with decreasing perceived legitimacy (Tallberg and Zurn, 2019, 583). Relating back to 
the crisis moment, this lack of legitimacy threatens to reduce the overall authority of 
international organizations.  
 
Sources of Institutional Legitimacy 
The legitimation or delegitimation of international organizations depends on perception at 
every stage of policy development, including “decision formulation, decision implementation, 
and decision outcome” (Scholte & Tallberg, 2018, 59). These stages can be subdivided into input 
and output sources of legitimacy. Put simply, input and output sources can be described as 
legitimacy attained through the procedure (input) and performance (output) of international 
organizations. Based on the attention applied to multilateral institutions by theorists such as 
Acharya and Ikenberry, this section will utilize international organizations to understand a 
component of international political legitimacy. Although these sources of legitimacy can be 





Input-Oriented Sources of Legitimacy  
Beetham and Lord assert that ‘input legitimacy’ refers to “procedures that increase public 
support” (1995, 453). A key part of this idea is the public’s determination regarding the fairness 
of rules and procedures of multilateral institutions. Input sources refer to legitimacy as a result of 
“providing access, participation, and representation” for members of international organizations 
(Tallberg et al, 2018, 14). In analyzing input sources of legitimacy, there will be a significant 
emphasis on key themes within global governance and how they affect perceived legitimacy. 
These themes include: Membership, the Multi-Stakeholder Approach, and Financial Power. 
 
(i) Membership  
The future of legitimacy within international organizations will be partly based on 
membership. Membership is an important component of global governance, both in terms of 
which states are included in various organizations, but also in terms of membership structures 
that may prioritize certain states over others. Some theorists have concluded that legitimacy is 
ultimately based on the inclusiveness and size of the membership (Keohane, 2006, 59; Eilstrup-
Sangiovanni, 2020, 3). However, inclusiveness needs to be further unpacked, as the simple 
membership of a particular state can be vastly different than its role. Membership impacts 
legitimacy through adequate participation and the determination of whether all affected parties 
are significantly involved in the process (Held, 2009, 539).  
The UN offers a useful illustrative example of the issue of membership as it pertains to 
IOs. The UN General Assembly consists of 193 member states, but the Security Council is only 
made up of five permanent and ten non-permanent member states. In this way, the UN does 
retain legitimacy through its “near universal membership”, but there is a substantial power 
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imbalance within its structure (Kirton, 2002, 157). The Security Council was created more to 
concentrate power of the leading post-World War II states and there was “little indication that 
the Security Council should in some way ‘represent’ the UN membership generally” (Stephen, 
2018, 107). This is critical to the difference between general and preferred members, which 
leads, in part, to global governance’s decrease in perceived legitimacy. Although it is possible 
for UN member states to be elected to the Security Council, the five permanent member states 
are in a much more privileged position, given their ability to deny the authorization of the use of 
force, the power of their veto, and the permanent nature of their seat. This has not gone 
unnoticed, as member states in 1979 began to advocate for equitable representation on the 
Council, yet this was met with promises of future reform which have not come into fruition 
(Stephen, 2018, 114). In this way, the Security Council has not capitalized on an opportunity to 
increase the legitimacy of the UN, instead deciding to maintain the concentration of political 
power and the resulting diplomatic imbalance. At the same time, the Council has attempted to 
counter delegitimation by creatively interpreting their legal foundation and taking on projects in 
new policy domains, such as organizing criminal tribunals (Stephen, 2018, 112). Further, the 
Security Council has created working practices that better involve non-council states (Stephen, 
2018, 112). That said, these practices are all informal in nature, which allows the Security 
Council to retain its power internally as opposed to undergoing substantial structural reform.  
This represents an important component of the crisis of global governance: the 
determination of membership and involvement in multilateral institutions. The extent to which 
legitimacy is affected by membership cannot be understated as many member states are looking 
for more powerful roles and responsibilities within key institutions (Acharya, 2017, 276). This is 
further expressed through the argument that “hegemonic ideologies may operate as a structural 
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factor at the international level that includes or excludes certain states from full membership or 
participation in the order” (Allan et al, 2018, 849). These factors demonstrate the importance of 
membership as an input-source of legitimacy.  
 
(ii) Multi-Stakeholder Approach 
Representation and membership within global governance has already been impacted 
based on the increased use of the multi-stakeholder approach to global governance. This 
approach involves engaging non-state actors, notably non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
academics, and corporate actors in key partnerships (Acharya, 2017, 273). It is generally 
accepted that this approach has improved the legitimacy of certain global initiatives, based on the 
engagement and collaboration between state and corporate actors (Mele & Scheepers, 2013, 562) 
(Bøås & McNeill, 2017, 19). This approach has been effective in increasing the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of global governance in certain key policy domains, notably regarding economic 
regulation, international trade, and human rights. Haufler argues that the private sector’s 
influence is increasingly being harnessed by international organizations in order to generate 
broader support for internationally beneficial policy outcomes (2010, 404). Further, Scholte has 
identified that by engaging non-state actors, international initiatives such as the Kimberley 
Process2 and the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria3 have been able to 
advocate for improvements to human rights (2011, 116). On the other hand, the multi-
 
2 The Kimberley Process is a global regulatory network that tracks the sale of rough diamonds in order to prevent 
diamonds from conflict zones entering global markets. The regulatory scheme is handled through an international 
certification process, yet it is implemented through domestic legislation and civil monitoring processes (Haufler, 
2009, 404.  
3 The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria was established in 2002 with the aim of reducing the 
impact of the aforementioned epidemics worldwide. The Fund invests approximately $4 Billion USD every year 
through partnerships with non-state actors, including NGOs, local governments, and the private sector.  
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stakeholder approach is generally understood as not having been utilized effectively within the 
topics of peace and security, which is a key policy domain for key large multilateral and regional 
institutions. That said, these examples demonstrate that innovative approaches to membership 
within global governance can be critical in increasing its perceived legitimacy, as well as the 
efficacy of outcomes on economic and humanitarian affairs. In other words, incorporating non-
state actors has been understood as an effective mechanism in increasing legitimacy.  
 
(iii) Financial Power 
A key component of legitimate institutional procedure is the financial contributions of 
actors to international organizations. These contributions are similar to membership fees, given 
the understanding that institutions require funding and resources in order to function. The 
relationship between financial contributions and perceived legitimacy is demonstrated through 
the benefits that actors received from their contributions. A key example of this is the Trump 
Administration’s repeated threats to reduce funding for central institutions, such as North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) if other states do not also fund equitably (Gheciu, 2019, 
44). These threats were realized to some degree when Trump threatened to revoke funding to the 
World Health Organization (WHO) during the COVID-19 pandemic (Wamsley, 2020). This is a 
substantial action, as the US provides 22% of WHO’s funding each year, with fluctuations 
depending on voluntary contributions (Wamsley, 2020). Although Congress maintains some 
level of control over authorizing funding, Trump’s rhetoric still displays a threat to international 
organizations. Scholte and Tallberg define proportionality as when states contribute financially 
to organizations based on their relative means, but financial power is exercised when states 
demand particular outcomes for their fiscal contributions (2018, 63). This is a component of fair 
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procedure, as inequities are created when states feel that they are receiving the same collective 
benefits while funding a higher proportion of operations and programs.   
Another critical aspect of financial power involves private actors and the ability of 
corporations, in particular, to influence the actions of multilateral institutions. For example, the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation are the third-highest funder of the WHO, behind the United 
States and the United Kingdom respectively (Graham, 2017, 20). This can be problematic 
because it can lead to explicit concerns regarding the determination of collective gains. The 
funding choices of private actors are far more likely to include internal or personal factors 
(Graham, 2017, 20). This demonstrates the power of financial contributions to international 
organizations. In order for procedural elements to remain legitimate, there must be an explicit 
degree of impartiality that ensures that decisions are made in favour of societal needs as opposed 
to private preferences (Scholte & Tallberg, 2018, 63-64).  
 
Output-Oriented Sources of Legitimacy 
The perceived effectiveness of global governance is an essential component of 
legitimacy. Scholte and Tallberg describe that the legitimacy of international organizations 
depends on “whether audiences see them as enhancing or undermining desired conditions in 
society” (2018, 60). In other words, one way that international organizations can attain 
legitimacy is through “generating benefits for state and societal actors” (Tallberg et al, 2018, 14). 
Specific benefits can be difficult to describe based on the fact that they differ depending on 
varying domestic interests, but the results of multilateral institutions are critical in assessing 
“performance in meeting the needs and values of citizens” (Beetham & Lord, 2001, 444). Result-
based factors affecting legitimacy can be described as output sources. In analyzing output-
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sources, there will be emphasis placed on the substance of the decisions of international 
organizations. Crucial factors in measuring the substance of these decisions include: Favourable 
Outcomes, Normative Structures, International Law, and Fair Procedure.  
 
(i) Favourable Outcomes 
Hurd’s analysis of favourable outcomes draws on Scharpf’s understanding of procedural 
factors and substantive outcomes. Scharpf asserts that input-oriented arguments cannot fully 
account for legitimacy perceptions based on the importance of performance-based indicators 
(1999, 188). In this regard, Hurd reiterates the value of this two-part analysis in arguing that 
favourable outcomes, correct procedure, and fairness are critical components for institutional 
legitimacy (2007, 67). Correct procedure is an input-source of legitimacy, while fairness can be 
attributed to either input or output sources. Favourable outcomes are first based on consent, 
which implies that member states will not consent to international organizations unless they see 
potential for political gains (Hurd, 2007, 67-68). They are also based on self-interest, which 
refers to the fact that member states will involve themselves in organizations that perpetuate their 
domestic interest (Hurd, 2007, 68). This is what could be considered a ‘realist approach’, but it 
reinforces the fact that favourable outcomes for a specific member state will reinforce their 
commitment to the institution. This concept of self-interest is important, because member states 
may remain involved in the work of multilateral institutions if they feel that there are potential 





(ii) Normative Structures 
 The decisions and outcomes of international organizations both exist within normative 
structures but also contribute to the development of new global norms. Democratic norms have 
been a component of a legitimate liberal international order, but there is increasing anti-
democratic sentiment which threatens to reduce the efficacy of global governance under a rules-
based model. Cooley situates this through arguing that authoritarian regimes have sought 
to “erode the norms that inform and underlie the liberal international political order” (2015, 49). 
Historically, the promotion of democratic ideals, norms, and principles has underpinned the 
liberal international order as it spreads the values prioritized by Western democracies. Although 
norm creation is an essential component of global governance, there is not adequate support for 
the claim that norms have to be democratic. This is central to the work of Acharya, who asserts 
that norm creation is more effective when based around local constructs (2018, 91). This is an 
intriguing consideration, as it presents the possibility that international norms are critical to 
legitimacy, but not necessarily tied to liberal democratic values.  
That said, norms still have to apply to a set of values in order to be deemed legitimate. 
This is what is argued by Cooley, as counter norms are continuously being created in opposition 
to liberal values (2015, 50-51). Although this argument is valid, it may cement a difference 
between liberal and illiberal practices. This contributes to a crisis of legitimacy, as states will 
increasingly disagree and reduce collaboration based on a lack of common values. This is 
supported by Jones, who asserts that western democracies are “reluctant to become directly 
involved in dialogues with those [states] who violate international norms” (2019, 130). This 
represents the challenge of maintaining liberal internationalism with illiberal states, as 
proponents of the liberal order are less likely to approve of their actions.  
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(iii) International Law  
 International law is an intriguing way to engage with legitimacy, as it has implications 
both in terms of procedure and performance. International law is primarily an output source of 
legitimacy due to the creation of global guidelines and legal systems mandating states and actors, 
although it similarly creates precedents and procedures that more closely appear as an input-
source. Some theorists argue that international law seeks legitimacy from “rationalist arguments 
about interdependence” and mutual benefit (Koskenniemi & Leino, 2002, 556). One of the 
challenges with international law is that there is a constant possibility for it to be unsettled 
(Orford, 2004, 459). This means that international law is only legitimate if states continue to 
view it as ‘just’ or at least continue to behave in a manner that adheres to the rules. In this regard, 
international law can be seen as an important output source, because of the impact of effective 
legal precedents on the legitimacy of international organizations. International law is built on 
coordination and is constantly changing depending on the shifting geopolitical climate. 
International law represents an environment in which crises of authority and legitimacy are 
consistently discussed and debated.  
 
(iv) Fair Procedure  
The topic of fair procedure can also be characterized as an output source of legitimacy. 
This concept is based around sociological procedural theory, which identifies that when “rules 
are passed according to accepted procedures and by established authorities, people appear to 
accept them as legitimate” (Hurd, 2007, 71). This is an output source as it relates to how 
procedures are utilized in creating outcomes, as opposed to the process itself. In other words, fair 
procedure can lead to decisions which are perceived as legitimate based on the process that was 
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followed. Correct procedure explains why states who are not necessarily benefitting from 
international organizations may remain engaged. If outcomes are developed based on a set of 
pre-determined rules, state actors are more likely to view the process and outcome as legitimate. 
What is not accounted for is the response of states that are continually facing outcomes that do 
not benefit them. Returning to the crisis moment, the growing concern surrounding the lack of 
acceptance of the rules-based international order can be seen as stemming in part from a system 
that has benefitted western democracies over other member states. Through assessing output 
sources, it is clear that the performance of international organizations plays an important role in 
determining legitimacy perceptions for member states.  
 
Legitimacy Matrix 
One can gather from the preceding analysis that input and output sources are inherently 
interrelated and thus, output sources may be of no use in determining legitimacy if a member 
state does not view the organization’s process as legitimate. For example, the decisions of certain 
international organizations may not be relevant to a member state that is not adequately 
represented within its structure. Recognizing this, Scholte and Tallberg utilize a legitimacy 
matrix (see Table 3 below) that accounts for both procedural and performance-based factors. 
These factors directly relate to the input and output sources of legitimacy. In terms of procedural 
themes, membership relates directly to participation, the multi-stakeholder approach represents 
efficiency, and financial power refers to proportionality. For performance themes, favourable 
outcomes refer to collective gains, normative structures relate to democracy promotion, and 
international law connects to distributive justice. This matrix measures the procedure and 
performance of multilateral institutions, alongside three key categories: Democratic, 
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Technocratic, and Fairness (Scholte & Tallberg, 2018, 62). Scholte and Tallberg clearly identify 
that technocratic measures strictly refer to the strength of policy institutions and “expertise-based 
problem solving” (2018, 62-63). This matrix leads to six sources of institutional legitimacy, as 
demonstrated in Figure 3.  
 
Table 3 – Scholte and Tallberg’s Legitimacy Matrix 
 Democratic Technocratic Fair 
Procedure 
Participation Efficiency Impartiality 
Accountability Expertise Proportionality 
Performance 
Democracy 
promotion in wider 
society 
Problem Solving Human dignity 
Collective Gains Distributive Justice 
(Scholte & Tallberg, 2018, 62) 
The results of this matrix are also well supported in the literature, as multiple theorists 
argue in favour of these different dimensions of legitimacy. For instance, the democratic 
approach resonates in the literature as authors such as Ikenberry posit that the liberal world order 
is based on “democratic solidarity” and promotion (2017, 4). Effective policy initiatives within 
international organizations have been measured based on their perceived “advancement of 
democratic values” (Petrasek, 2019, 107). For his part, Scharpf asserts that a technocratic 
approach would allow for collective gains to be realized faster and argues that this approach 
would be more efficient for national governments (1999, 188-189). This is further supported by 
Keohane and Nye, who argue that multilateral institutions can support member states through 
problem solving more effectively with additional resources (1974, 53). Finally, the components 
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of the matrix pertaining to fairness are important as a failure to provide distributive justice and 
impartiality leads to delegitimation (Anderson et al, 2019, 664). This is further emphasized 
through the necessity of predictability within international organizations (Hurd, 2007, 71; 
Stephen, 2018, 100). The use of this matrix will be critical in analyzing the state of institutional 
legitimacy for fragmentation and the liberal international approaches to global governance.   
 Global governance systems Approaches to global governance are legitimized or 
delegitimized in various ways. The effects on legitimacy can be broken down into input and 
output sources. These sources are critical to understanding how legitimacy is affected, 
particularly during the current crisis moment. This assessment of international political 
legitimacy also demonstrates the complexity of the topic. Indeed, institutional legitimacy is a 
layered subject and it is challenging to create any uniform understandings of legitimacy, 
especially as different combinations of legitimacy sources can be successful or unsuccessful at 
any given time (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2020, 25). The next section of analysis will utilize the 
aforementioned legitimacy matrix to assess fragmentation and liberal internationalism as 
legitimate global governance approaches. 
 
Chapter 4 - The Future of Global Governance 
 Liberal internationalism and fragmentation have often been presented as opposing 
perspectives when it comes to approaches to global governance. These perspectives are both 
critical in understanding the current crisis of global governance, but the question of whether 
liberal internationalism or fragmentation will prevail in the years and decades ahead is, to some 
extent, irrelevant. Both approaches to global governance coexist to some degree and will 
continue to do so. The crisis of global governance is not one of competing approaches, but is 
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instead a crisis of legitimacy. Both the liberal international order and the fragmentation approach 
are struggling to maintain international legitimacy in a global environment full of change. This 
section is not a complete analysis of legitimacy as it relates to liberal internationalism or 
fragmentation, but instead serves to draw attention to how both models of global governance 
face a crisis of legitimacy. This crisis cannot be easily resolved, which is why it is important to 
consider the complexities of legitimacy, as outlined in Chapter 3, as they relate to both liberal 
internationalism and fragmentation. This section will start by examining how international 
legitimacy is affected by the decreasing engagement of western democracies and the rising 
tolerance of illiberal practices.  
 
Coexistence of Liberal Internationalism and Fragmentation   
The role of actors within global governance is one of the clearest indications that 
fragmentation and liberal internationalism are co-existing. The multi-stakeholder approach 
consists of integrating non-state actors, such as academics, NGOs, and corporate stakeholders 
into global governance organizations. This approach fulfills the criterion of democratic 
participation in the legitimacy matrix, while offering a decentralized decision-making structure. 
This blended approach is considered to be an effective tool in increasing legitimacy, as it 
incorporates a broader network of actors, beyond state leaders and diplomats (Mele & Scheepers, 
2013, 562; Bøås and McNeill, 2017, 19; Plesch & Weiss, 2015, 202). Incorporating a wider 
scope of stakeholders can be effective in sharing accountability and responsibility within the 
policy development process. Bäckstrand supports this argument and adds that “multi-stakeholder 
partnership can connect local practices and global norms through their flexible and decentralized 
character” (2006, 298). By connecting local actors to international processes, it allows for burden 
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sharing and a greater number of perspectives to be utilized. The multi-stakeholder approach is an 
effective example of how fragmentation can exist within the normative structures of liberal 
internationalism. 
The multi-stakeholder approach has been used successfully in a variety of policy domains 
within key international organizations. The UN has been a major supporter of this approach and 
has gone as far as to institutionalize the process through a commitment to developing multi-
stakeholder partnerships in order to accomplish the goals of the 2030 Agenda (Hoxtell, 2016, 3). 
The multi-stakeholder approach was identified as a key focus through Goal 17 of the Agenda: 
Partnerships for the Goals. (A/RES/70/1). The Agenda calls for increased partnerships between 
public, private, and civil entities in order to share financial, technical, and human resources 
(A.RES.70/1). This has resulted in UN Sustainable Development Partnerships monitoring and 
oversight bodies to better track and support the creation and maintenance of multi-stakeholder 
partnerships (Mohammed, 2019).  
At the same time, a major critique of the multi-stakeholder approach is that it allows for 
greater corporate involvement in government decision-making. Many NGOs have opposed 
increasing corporate actors within global governance. This has led to initiatives such as the 
“Alliance for a Corporate-Free UN” (Mele & Scheepers, 2013, 570). There is a justified concern 
that allowing private influence will further open the door to regulatory practices that favour 
corporations (Biermann et al, 2009, 29). That said, there are a number of policy domains that 
continue to seek greater involvement from a variety of non-state actors. Theorists have identified 
peace and security, refugees, and the environment as themes which have effectively elicited a 
multi-stakeholder approach (Acharya, 2016, 455; Shirkey, 2019, 654). One of the reasons for this 
is that state actors handling these domains benefit from a group of actors that can effectively 
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handle overarching policy development, as well as local implementation and monitoring of key 
projects and initiatives. This method allows for fragmentation in the form of decentralization of 
power, while simultaneously modeling key elements of liberal democratic pluralist practices. 
Indeed, involving non-state actors can increase the democratic nature of policy-development 
processes as more individuals and actors are involved within the process. Bäckstrand cautions 
that it is impossible for domestic democratic practices to be fully transferred to the international 
sector and thus, global legitimacy can only be achieved through hybrid models of governance 
that increase partnerships and accountability for state and non-state actors (2006, 293). In this 
way, fragmentation of actors allows for some elements of liberal values to be maintained. This 




A significant challenge for legitimacy of global governance is organizational 
performance. Dellmuth and Tallberg assert that public perception of legitimacy is mostly based 
on institutional problem-solving capabilities (2015, 13). Building on this perception, it must be 
determined whether effective problem-solving can occur through democratic norms, which have 
been historically interpreted as western-centric or whether institutions and actors will have to 
instead embrace a degree of impartiality within international politics. If norms within global 
governance were no longer necessarily democratic, it might positively impact legitimacy. 
However, it could also potentially signal the end of liberal internationalism. That said, strict 
adherence to liberal values is not necessarily tied to the legitimacy of global governance.  
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Indeed, there is an inherent paradox when discussing these topics. Jones articulates 
that “this contradiction between imperatives raises the problem of whether liberal 
internationalism … has not so diluted itself as to be unworkable in practice” (2019, 128). This 
assertion is based on the fact that liberal internationalism has a wide set of norms and practices, 
which can overlap and contradict one another. For example, global governance may require 
additional active participants in order to be successful (which mirrors democratic ideals of 
pluralism), but this could come at the cost of the promotion of democratic values if the end result 
leads to the inclusion of ‘illiberal actors’. Within the field of human rights, where it is 
increasingly understood that emerging states can offer “reform proposals that will both 
strengthen and rationalize the system and then build a coalition of states to get them adopted” 
(Petrasek, 2019, 117). That said, this does not necessarily support that these coalitions would 
actively work against democratic norms, but it creates opportunities for illiberal states to gain 
influence within This is reflective of a policy domain where middle-power states are increasing 
their significance. This relates closely to Ikenberry’s understanding of Liberal Internationalism 
3.0, in which the universal order would no longer be tied solely to western powers but would still 
rely on a set of identified and agreed-upon norms (2009, 82). Thus, even if normative structures 
were not entirely democratic, there is still value in structures that are approved by a majority of 
states.  
Returning to Biermann’s model of fragmentation, it is important to consider that 
normative structures would not have to be entirely conflictive or synergistic. A cooperative 
normative structure would involve norms that do not inherently conflict between key states and 
there is some collaboration between actors, regardless of norms they subscribe to. This 
demonstrates that normative structures do not have to be entirely democratic, but instead could 
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account for other perspectives. This is necessary because western democracies are unlikely to 
revoke normative structures that aim to spread democracy, based on the fact that even 
proponents of fragmentation recognize that a global governance model accepting of illiberal 
norms would be a lower quality system (Acharya, 2016, 458). The question remains in terms of 
how illiberal states can be better incorporated into global governance without sacrificing the 
democratic norms that western democracies tend to prioritize. This is important because many 
key international organizations have historically relied on the financial contributions of western 
democracies. Global governance could take on multiple cooperative normative structures that do 
not require complete approval, but instead are focused on eliminating conflicts and pursuing 
mutual benefits and collective gains. This is expressed by MacDonald and MacDonald, who 
posit that open communities do not need to find agreeable solutions, but instead should focus on 
finding agreed-upon problems that need to be solved (2020, 530). Further examination of 
institutional performance could lead to greater understandings of international cooperation.  
 
The Role of Institutions 
The increased importance and frequency of regionalized international organizations and 
agreements is indicative of fragmentation of institutions (Acharya, 2017, 100). Although regional 
organizations are considered by some to threaten liberal internationalism and its central 
institutions (Plesch & Weiss, 2015, 203), regionalism is recognized and, in some cases, promoted 
in key multilateral legal instruments such as the UN Charter (Chap. 7, Art. 52). This 
demonstrates that central institutions of the post-WWII liberal order comprehend and allow for 
regional space, likely in an effort to ensure that regional issues are not defined by external actors 
(Acharya, 2011, 100). In part, this approach relates to the UN’s commitment to multi-stakeholder 
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partnerships, due to the additional success gained from utilizing regional actors. On the other 
hand, this has prompted regional organizations and agreements to thrive amongst developing 
states, given the greater ability they have in influencing local issues as opposed to universal 
topics (Acharya, 2011, 95). This suggests that fragmented institutional structures exist to allow 
states to handle topics more narrow in scope. However, one of the challenges of these 
fragmented structures is that they can create institutions which do not uphold liberal values. This 
can lead to the creation of illiberal norms which challenge the role of large multilateral 
institutions (Abrahamsen et al, 2019, 13). 
That said, there is support for the idea that liberal international institutions should 
promote fragmentation. Rather than refuting the approach, Plesch and Weiss posit that the 
current liberal international order should not be considered immutable and instead should be 
open to reform in order to maintain significant membership and engagement in robust 
organizational systems, including the UN (2015, 203). Indeed, for states that reject liberal norms, 
engagement with the liberal order has not necessarily decreased. China has continued its 
commitment to free trade among other elements of liberalism (Allan et al, 2018, 864). Further, 
many emerging states are gaining power within central liberal institutions, such as the IMF and 
the World Bank (Kahler, 2013, 725). This reflects the fact that emerging states are still engaged 
with elements and institutions of the liberal order. That said, this also raises further questions as 
to how well illiberal states can integrate into historically liberal organizations. This is a challenge 
to the overall legitimacy of global governance and requires additional attention. However, 
democratic legitimization can be thought of as cyclical depending on political demand 
(Dingwerth, 2020, 735). This means that democratic legitimization may have been preferred for 
the last few decades, but may not be demanded to the same extent in the future. This concept is 
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central to understanding the input and output sources of legitimacy in terms of how institutions 
are legitimized.  
 
The Problem of Illiberalism 
 Although both liberal internationalism and fragmentation exist as approaches to global 
governance, the crisis moment is still substantial. The crisis moment of global governance can be 
situated as a crisis of diminishing western engagement and rising illiberal practices. Indeed, this 
is what many theorists have argued, including Abramowitz, who asserts that the crisis of global 
governance will result in the “replacement of global democratic norms with authoritarian 
practices” (2018, 5). This is further supported by Ikenberry who proposes that the international 
order is in crisis because of a lack of dedication to liberal democracies and their values (2017, 7). 
It is important to reconsider this question to focus instead on the relationship between global 
governance and the question of legitimacy, recognizing that legitimacy is not necessarily tied to 
liberal values. Buchanan and Keohane argue that “multilateral institutions will only thrive if they 
are viewed as legitimate” (2006, 407). It is critical that legitimacy and its connection to liberal 
internationalism and fragmentation is further explored. The presence of illiberal practices and 
authoritarian states threatens to undermine liberal internationalism and it is therefore necessary to 
consider whether illiberalism has an overall impact on the legitimacy of global governance. 
Further, it is more challenging to change normative structures away from democratic values once 
they have been established (Dingwerth et al, 2020, 734). Based on the fact that liberal 
internationalism has been the central approach to global governance in the past few decades, it 
must be considered how easily democratic norms could be loosened.   
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 Fragmentation and liberal internationalism can coexist provided that institutions, actors, 
and norms are not in conflict with each other, but instead are loosely related. The challenge with 
this is that certain liberal democratic values modeled on Western liberalism are ostensibly a key 
component of the liberal international order. This includes components of democratic ideals such 
as increased membership and participation (Scholte & Tallberg, 2018, 62). Nye asserts that these 
democratic norms were created at a time when emerging economies, such as China or India, 
were not as significant as they are today (2017, 10-11). The intriguing component of illiberal 
practices is how they no longer can be solely applied to specific countries or regions. For 
example, recent human rights sanctions towards Iran, Syria, North Korea, South Sudan and 
Myanmar, were all passed by the UN with substantial non-Western support (Petrasek, 2019, 
109). Similarly, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey have all expressed support for illiberal policies 
and practices even though they have been considered democratization successes in recent years 
(Gheciu, 2019, 41; Önis & Kutlay, 2020, 4). This demonstrates that although illiberal practices 
are becoming more frequent, they are also becoming more unpredictable. For a global 
governance system that has historically prioritized the liberal values of free trade and human 
rights, this creates a number of problems and contributes to the severity of the current crisis 
moment.  
 The underlying problem with illiberal practices within the current global governance 
system can be referred to as the democratic paradox of pluralism (Önis & Kutlay, 2020, 2). This 
paradox consists of democratic pluralism, in which non-Western states, who historically have not 
been central members of global governance, are taking up opportunities within international 
organizations. This represents the severity of the crisis moment, as democratic practices are 
increasingly resulting in the toleration of illiberal practices. Returning to Scholte and Tallberg’s 
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legitimacy matrix, the pursuit of democratic procedure, by increasing participation and 
membership, is not resulting in democratic performance or the promotion of democracy in 
society (2018, 62). In this regard, it is difficult to see how liberal internationalism can sustain its 
legitimacy without increasing the tolerance of illiberal practices.  
 The key argument here is that the legitimacy of global governance must be further 
studied in order to better understand the impacts of an increase in illiberal practices amidst a 
historically liberal global governance system. Countries considered to be “not free” only 
accounted for “12% of global income in 1990”, while it is 33% today (Önis & Kutlay, 2020, 14). 
This demonstrates the importance of economic strength to political power. Given the earlier 
discussion pertaining to the political shortcomings of key western democracies, it is vital to 
consider the impacts of emerging authoritarian states and failing democracies on the legitimacy 
of international organizations (Önis & Kutlay, 2020, 15). Ikenberry and Acharya both support 
their respective approaches to global governance, yet the crisis of legitimacy is larger and more 
substantial. The simultaneous realities of emerging authoritarian states and increasingly 
isolationist democracies will result in shifts within global governance (Önis & Kutlay, 2020, 14-
15; Petrasek, 2019, 117). These shifts will not focus on cementing fragmentation or liberal 
internationalism as the singular approach to global governance, but will instead be focused on 
establishing and sustaining the legitimacy of international organizations for both western 
democracies and emerging states.  
 
Conclusion 
In attempting to contextualize the current crisis moment, this thesis has utilized the liberal 
internationalist and fragmentation approaches to unpack the legitimacy deficit facing global 
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governance. Rather than offer a comprehensive overview of individual global governance 
structures, this thesis has instead focused on the complexity of international political legitimacy 
and drawn attention to the persistent problem of legitimacy for global governance approaches. 
In understanding the current crisis moment, this thesis demonstrated that rising nationalist 
and populist sentiment in Western nations significantly contributes to an unstable international 
political order. Coupled with the rise of illiberal practices and authoritarian states, the historically 
liberal world order is being severely threatened. The importance of funding within global 
governance systems was also explored, as the increasing financial contributions from 
industrializing states or private actors also threatens to change a system that has historically 
relied heavily on primarily Western funding. Although the crisis moment is sometimes viewed as 
a crisis of liberal internationalism, it is actually global governance that is facing a legitimacy 
crisis.  
This thesis has demonstrated that international political legitimacy is a complex topic that 
deserves further attention. Through the work of Scholte and Tallberg in particular, it is clear that 
global governance can be legitimized or delegitimized in various ways (2018). This 
categorization of input-sources and output-sources of legitimacy is extremely helpful in 
understanding the dimensions of how the legitimacy of global governance systems might be 
considered. Specifically, input-sources represent procedural legitimacy whereas output-sources 
represent legitimacy based on performance. The use of this matrix also leads to an increased 
appreciation for the complexities of global governance approaches. Understanding the sources of 
legitimacy through this matrix is extremely effective for assessing global governance 
approaches. Further, it assists in understanding the importance of institutional legitimacy within 
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global governance. Determining how institutions can improve their procedures and performance 
in a way that increases legitimacy is a topic that deserves further attention.  
Based on the complexity of international political legitimacy, the thesis articulates 
important questions pertaining to legitimacy and global governance that must be addressed in the 
near future. In terms of institutional performance, it is critical to understand that eliminating 
global conflicts and pursuing collective gains are important determinants of legitimacy in global 
governance. This directly relates to the output-sources of legitimacy and also connect to the 
initial discussion regarding the crisis moment. Further research into the performance and 
perceived value on multilateral institutions would be effective in understanding how global 
governance can maintain legitimacy.  
A consideration of procedural components of legitimacy is also necessary in further 
understanding the legitimacy deficit facing global governance. In an increasingly globalized 
world, the fragmentation and liberal internationalist approaches have both demonstrated the 
growing presence of non-state actors. Membership and roles within global governance structures 
are critical to its perceived legitimacy and thus, identifying procedural barriers would allow for 
more legitimate systems to be created.  
The thesis also raised important questions about democracy and illiberalism and their 
intersection with international political legitimacy. It can be argued that the liberal international 
order will not cease to exist, but will face several existential challenges pertaining to the topics of 
democracy and illiberal practices (Önis & Kutlay, 2020, 15). In this regard, fragmentation and 
liberal internationalism are effective tools in understanding the legitimacy crisis that is facing 
international organizations. Illiberalism and democracy are key topics based on how they 
intersect with sources of legitimacy. For example, Acharya’s understanding of fragmentation 
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does not adequately account for illiberal practices and instead supports the promotion of 
democracy through the support of emerging states and their increased participation (2016, 458). 
This is similar to Ikenberry’s assessment of the future of the liberal international order which 
would include a decentralized system of actors, but still with a focus on promoting democracy 
(2009, 80). From these analytical approaches, it is clear that global governance is struggling to 
include more state and non-state actors without compromising on Western democratic principles 
that have historically underlined global governance.  
The democratic paradox of pluralism, as outlined by Önis and Kutlay is a critical 
assessment of the crisis of global governance (2020, 2). The fragmentation approach does not 
necessarily result in increased tolerance for illiberal practices, however; the coupling of 
emerging authoritarian states and weakening western democracies creates a significant challenge 
in terms of how to maintain legitimacy and increase accountability within multilateral 
institutions. In this regard, further study of illiberal practices within global governance is 
required in order to adequately understand the relationship between democratic norms, 
illiberalism, and legitimacy. 
  International political legitimacy is a complex topic that requires additional and ongoing 
attention. Global governance has faced a persistent crisis of legitimacy, but for some it is now 
more pressing than in the past. Through examination of sources of legitimacy and the importance 
of addressing both illiberal and democratic practices, the legitimacy gap for global governance 
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